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Whose Common Law for Labor
Relations?
Paul R. Verkuilt
Richard Epstein attacks the New Deal for enacting the Wagner Act
and thereby subverting the common law which, with "interstitial modifi-
cation," 1 was well suited to deal with the problems of labor relations.
Professor Epstein offers a radical critique of the New Deal and dismisses
its intellectual contributions to the development of labor policy. Karl
Klare had earlier done the same thing from an entirely different perspec-
tive.' My purpose is to say a few words on behalf of the deceased.
Let me add an ounce of history to Epstein's pound of logic. The open-
ing words of The Common Law perfectly fit the occasion:
The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political the-
ories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the
prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a
good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by
which men should be governed.'
Despite Professor Epstein's attempt to "put aside" conditions of labor
unrest in the 1930s," we cannot be blind to the fact that in 1934 and 1935
labor-management relations and the economy were at a low ebb. There
were strikes and violence which, according to historical reports, amounted
to civil war in many communities.5 Moreover, with staggering unemploy-
ment and diminishing wages, it was difficult to accept the theory of com-
t Dean and Professor, Tulane University School of Law.
1. These words were part of the paper delivered by Professor Epstein at Yale in February, 1983.
Since then the author has moderated his attack, and I am at a loss to locate some of his more memora-
ble phrases. Originally, the author was much more direct in his attack upon New Deal legislation at
the time of its enactment. Since this Symposium was about the New Deal, I will still focus my
comments on that period.
2. Professor Klare attacks the New Deal for undermining what he sees as the radical intention of
the Wagner Act. See Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern
Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978). In some ways, being caught between
the critiques of Epstein and Klare confirms the success of the balancing act the New Deal labor
legislation sought to perform.
3. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). Since Epstein relies upon the common law as
the basis for his critique of labor legislation, Holmes' view of how the common law emerges seems
particularly relevant.
4. See Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legisla-
tion, 92 YALE L.J. 1357 (1983).
5. 2 A. SCHLESINGER, THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 385 (1958).
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petition as a solution. Given that environment, it is hard to take seriously
Epstein's premise that choosing to become an employer or employee "is
strictly a private act."'
Yet the New Deal did not accept the full implications of an economic
determinism that the image of generations of coal miners in places like
Harlan County might invite. Such a view of the world, if held by the
Roosevelt administration, would have undermined any semblance of con-
tractual theory in the employment context. But FDR was in fact no great
champion of labor.7 On this score as on many others he was a pragmatist.
He did recognize the rights of labor to organize as a part of the ill-fated
National Recovery Act and later when he established the National Labor
Board by presidential proclamation.8 In these efforts FDR conceded the
obvious: Some federal supervision was necessary to maintain public order
and to obtain greater equality of bargaining power. Given the times, this
finger-on-the-scale approach must have been the minimal politically ac-
ceptable response and, accordingly, a necessary intrusion into what was an
unbalanced and volatile market for labor.
9
Thus New Deal labor-relations policy was informed not so much by
conservative or radical theorizing as by incrementalization, a process
whereby government control reacted to political necessity. The Norris-
LaGuardia Act served more to implement this honest-broker approach of
the New Deal than to upset existing labor-management understandings.
The Wagner Act went beyond FDR's initial concessions and to that ex-
tent had a radicalizing potential. However, its implementation, as Profes-
sor Klare acknowledges,' 0 was a masterpiece of judicial and administra-
tive temporizing. It is hard to second guess such a successful attempt to
mediate among competing social values in a time of unprecedented
upheaval.
Epstein's case for common law superiority in the face of these historical
realities is seriously weakened. For common law theory to work, Epstein
stipulates the "faithful enforcement" of agreements by the state." As
Holmes reminds us, however, the prejudices of judges have much to do
with the creation of the common law. In this case, prejudice could easily
6. Epstein, supra note 4, at 1366.
7. See A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 5, at 402-03.
8. Id. at 150-51. FDR did what he could to ward off Senator Wagner's attempts to enact more
far-reaching labor legislation in (what was later to become) the Wagner Act. Id. at 403.
9. Similar pressures led the Roosevelt administration to enact protective agricultural legislation to
allow dairymen and farmers to organize so as to offset the market power of large dairies and super-
markets. See Block v. Consumer Nutrition Inst., 104 S. Ct. 2450, 2452-53 (1984) (describing the
legislative background to the enactment of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937).
10. See Kare, supra note 2, at 309-10.
11. See Epstein, supra note 4, at 1366.
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be found among judges who were unwilling to treat evenhandedly union
attempts to organize labor.
One gets a feel for the judicial outlook in Chief Justice Taft's corre-
spondence. In a letter to his cousin, Horace Taft, written in 1921, he said:
The only class which is distinctly arrayed against the court is a class
that does not like the courts at any rate, and that is organized labor.
That faction we have to hit every little while, because they are con-
tinually violating the law and depending on threats and violence to
accomplish their purpose.12
If this attitude was prevalent in the judiciary, it must be true that in many
communities the opportunities for unions to utilize common law tort rem-
edies to enjoin illegal employer resistance to organization were non-
existent. Or, to place the matter in a more recent setting, the possibilities
for neutral treatment by common law judges in labor cases in the 1930's
were no greater than the chances of civil rights workers thirty years later
to use the common law courts to protect themselves from violence in places
like Holly Springs, Mississippi or Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana. In
some communities the conditions for common law resolution of contract or
tort problems did not exist. In Lockean terms, these are the communities
where civil society had given away to a state of nature, at least for certain
individuals or groups.
The controversy surrounding the yellow dog contract illustrates this
problem of neutral application of common law doctrines. Epstein contends
that a contract whereby a worker agrees not to become a member of a
union ought to be respected in the same way as any other. No one can
doubt that to be a proposition with broad appeal. However, the real world
problem with yellow dog contracts was not that employers enforced them
against employees, which would have been unnecessary since these em-
ployees had only contracts at will in any event. The problem was that the
existence of such contracts allowed employers to obtain broad injunctions
against unions for inducing or coercing breaches of those contracts. Judges
with a predisposition against unions were willing to distort the common
law by importing into the labor setting the tort principle of third-party
inducement to breach from cases like Lumley v. Gye.13 Thus, in the early
12. H. PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 967 (1939).
13. Lumley v. Gye, 2 E. & B. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853), involved a tort of malicious
inducement of breach by Gye, who tried to get Johanna Wagner to sing for him while she was under
exclusive contract to Lumley, a rival impresario. It was preceded by Lumley v. Wagner, 1 DeG., M.
& G. 604, 42 Eng. Reg. 687 (Oh. 1852), where Mine. Wagner was enjoined from breaching her
exclusive contract. No such prior litigation against the employee was undertaken in the labor context
because the employment contracts were not exclusive or for a term. The context therefore was entirely
different, with the union being the only target of the employer's wrath. See C. GREGORY & H. KATZ,
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1900's employers could have injunctions against labor-organizing activi-
ties, many of which were not unlawful in themselves, for the asking.14
Professor Epstein distorts the historical record in his discussion of
Lumley v. Gye when he states that: "Both the English and American
courts extended Lumley to ordinary labor contracts, finding the use of the
injunction uncontroversial."' 5 In fact, the application of Lumley to the
labor setting in England was a cause celebre at the turn of the century 6
and led to a statutory reversal by Parliament of the common law that
forbade damages actions as well as injunctions against unions. I7 Thus, the
reaction against Lumley in its own setting was even more emphatic, swift,
and comprehensive than it was in the United States. It can only be accu-
rate to say that Lumley was uncontroversial among the common law
judges who extended it without much thought to the labor context. Once
that occurred, however, the legislative reaction on both sides of the Atlan-
tic made it clear how deep the controversy ran. By failing to appreciate
the limits of precedent, common law judges in effect lost jurisdiction over
the field of labor relations.' 8
Epstein relies heavily upon the connection between Lumley and Hitch-
man Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell'" in constructing his argument in favor
of yellow dog contracts. But Brandeis' dissent in Hitchman, which argued
for a narrow legal definition of coercion, contained the more potent empir-
ical point:
If it is coercion to threaten to strike unless plaintiff consents to a
closed union shop, it is coercion also to threaten not to give one em-
ployment unless the applicant will consent to a closed non-union
shop. The employer may sign the union agreement for fear that la-
bor may not be otherwise obtainable; the workman may sign the
individual agreement for fear that employment may not be otherwise
obtainable. But such fear does not imply coercion in a legal sense.20
The problem for Brandeis was that the Court, in affirming the district
judge, had permitted the common law principle of coercion to work in one
direction only: against the union organizers but not against the employer'
who obtained the closed (non-union) shop agreement. Brandeis' approach,
LABOR AND THE LAW 93-95 (3d ed. 1979).
14. See generally F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
15. Epstein, supra note 4, at 1374 (footnote omitted).
16. See generally 0. KAHN-FREUND, LABOUR AND THE LAW 8-9, 251-64 (1977).
17. Trade Disputes Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 41 (creating a catalogue of economic torts that would
not give rise to liability if committed in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute).
18. See 0. KAHN-FREUND, supra note 16, at 18: "In the formulation of rules which regulate the
relations between employers and workers the common law has played a minor role."
19. 245 U.S. 229 (1917).
20. Id. at 271 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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as a matter of common law interpretation, might have been one way for
the courts to retain jurisdiction over the labor-management setting. By de-
nying the ready application of inducement-to-breach actions against the
union, as opposed to actions against the employees, employees could
gather the countervailing strength to organize. Timing in this context was
critical for both sides. If the union could not approach employees in suffi-
cient numbers to organize resistance to the non-union shop, there could be
no real possibility of success. Employers, with the instant availability of
injunctions, could effectively stop union organizing in its tracks.
The yellow dog contract story tells us a lot about the viability of the
common law in an age of statutes. In Adair v. United States" and Cop-
page v. Kansas,22 two cases Epstein relies upon, the Court found that the
Congress and state legislatures had specifically overruled the common law
by statute in outlawing yellow dog contracts as early as 1898.23 Thus the
common law had been clearly displaced by popular will. It took the heroic
measure of constitutionalizing prior common law principles in Adair and
Coppage to vindicate the Epstein position. His complaints about the Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act's doing violence to common law principles must be un-
derstood against this background of twenty years of prior legislative activ-
ity that sought to achieve the same result.
The Court refused to permit the statutory modification of the common
law to take place.24 Epstein has accepted the Court's view of the common
law by freezing its principles in time. The fallacy in this approach is that
it can be implemented only by constitutional fiat, which is a far more
rigid mode of decisionmaking than the process of statutory modification.
To maintain this premise about the superiority of common law solu-
tions, Epstein must conclude that the common law would not have
changed significantly over the last fifty years.25 Even in the absence of the
New Deal administrative state, that proposition is dubious. The forces
that led to the establishment of the Wagner Act, and the creation of the
list of unfair labor practices Epstein decries, would have worked them-
selves out in a more fitful fashion directly upon the common law itself. As
the "prejudices" of judges changed, so undoubtedly would the common
law. It is unfair to hold the New Deal solutions up to the mirror of the
common law doctrines which preceded the New Deal. What should be
21. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
22. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
23. Comparable legislative activity occurred in England in 1906. See supra note 17.
24. See G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 2-3 (1982) (arguing that
statutes should be viewed as part of the common law).
25. To some extent Professor Epstein tries to avoid this argument by stipulating what he calls
"the best set of private-law rules." Epstein, supra note 4, at 1359. But that level of abstraction just
won't wash. It effectively contradicts the very process by which the common law rules emerge.
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done is to compare New Deal solutions with what the common law would
have become had there not been a New Deal. That, of course, is impossi-
ble to do, but my hunch is that one of the reasons the early common law
of contracts is still recognizable today is that we have relieved the system
of some of the pressures which overarching social problems like labor-
management relations would have imposed upon it.
Moreover, as a practical matter it would be very difficult to put a lid on
the assertion of rights under the labor laws even if it were possible to
dismantle the formal apparatus of the NLRB. At the present time, the
NLRB receives some 60,000 cases annually.26 Without the NLRB, a
number of these grievances would at least initially have to be absorbed by
the state or federal court system. At that point litigants would be subject
to the vagaries of decisionmaking by judges whose understanding of labor
relations would be rudimentary at best. This cannot help creating a con-
fused jurisprudence that would itself, for some undefined period, serve to
upset labor relations. The virtue of administrative decisionmaking is its
predictability; in many industries that is a more significant factor than
substantive outcome.
Perhaps these observations do Professor Epstein the disservice of taking
his proposals too seriously. The critique of labor legislation from the com-
mon law perspective remains a powerful motif and raises the valid in-
quiry of whether New Deal solutions have run their course when the
conditions which created them are no longer present.2 7 In the labor field,
few have been bold enough to raise the deregulation banner, and one has
to be indebted to Epstein for that effort. Similar exercises should be un-
dertaken in analyzing the current viability of New Deal agricultural regu-
lation.28 But that takes us far off course. For present purposes it is enough
to establish that the New Deal did the job it was called upon to perform
in the labor field at a time when common law solutions, however idealized
in hindsight, were unavailable or counterproductive.
26. See 45 NLRB ANN. REP. (1980), reprinted in LABOR LAW REPORTS No. 1152, Feb. 2, 1982,
at 1-2.
27. It may be that Professor Calabresi's suggestion has validity in this context. He has proposed
that when statutes become obsolete, the courts should have the ability to treat them as part of the
common law and to revise them accordingly. G. CALABRESI, supra note 24, at 3-5. This is the corol-
lary to Calabresi's principle that statutes ought to be regarded as part of the common law.
28. Attempts at agricultural deregulation by the Reagan Administration have so far floundered
before entrenched interests. See Reagan Yields to the Kiwi Lobby?, N.Y. Times, July 3, 1984, at
A15, col. 3. The historical justification for agricultural marketing orders, see supra note 9, is desper-
ately in need of reexamination.
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